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This article is the first installment of a projected set of articles
summarizing, with its historical development, modem-day due
process doctrine. In fact, this article on territorial due process is
only one of two parts on that particular aspect of due process. This
first part is a conceptual analysis of territorial due process. The
second part will be a synthesis of the analytical threads of the
doctrine into constitutional "rules" and their use. That is also the
projected scheme for the substantive and procedural aspects of due
process: first analysis, then synthesis.
The goal of this projected set of articles is to see due process
of law whole-to develop a coherent theory of due process in its
various doctrinal manifestations so that the law student and the
busy practitioner can make more sense of the due process issues
with which they are confronted. It is based on Supreme Court
articulated doctrine, but is, of course, interpretative, often critical
and perhaps even a bit irreverent. But then whoever claimed that
due process as now practiced is the apotheosis of judicial wisdom?
The following is an introduction to the whole set of articles on
due process, collectively entitled A Student and Practitioners'
Guide to Due Process of Law. This introduction should help put
territorial due process in perspective.
* Professor, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., 1962, Ohio State
University; J.D., 1965, Ohio State University.
I am most grateful to Jo Walton Eaton, articles editor of Volume 80 of this
review, for getting me started, for her patient persistence in keeping me going and
for her editorial comments and help along the way. I also am indebted to the staff
of Volume 81 for their editorial assistance, and especially to James E. Showen,
whose own note on Shaffer u. Heitner (appearing at 80 W. VA. L. Rzv. 285) was most
helpful to me.
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INTRODUCTION
The guarantee of due process of law is in its broadest sense a
guarantee to the individual of judicial protection against arbitrary
government. Government can be arbitrary in three general ways:
(1) by attempting to govern those not within its territory; (2) by
making arbitrary policy manifested in rules of law; and (3) by
interfering with important individual interests without procedures
that assure that the general policy is being fairly applied to indi-
vidual cases-"fair" here encompassing two distinct but related
ideas: (a) accurate (not mistaken) application and (b) predictable
application.'
The meaning of fifth and fourteenth amendment due process
most easily inferable from the constitutional language itself is
that the government may not visit criminal-type sanctions on an
individual without going through the ordinary legal procedures,
i.e., a law and notice of its breach and a hearing-"procedural due
process." That this is probably not even the complete "original"
meaning as used by the authors of the Constitution was pointed
out by the late Roscoe Pound:
The doctrines protecting against procedural arbitrariness usually travel
under the rubrics "procedural due process," "void for vagueness," and
"retroactivity" (including "ex post facto"). Procedural due process is concerned
with the accurate translation of general policy into concrete instances. The vague-
ness and retroactivity doctrines are concerned primarily with the translation of
policy into rules such that application of the general policy to concrete instances is
predictable. Sometimes the Court will talk about an act being a forbidden bill of
attainder. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Bills of attainder are a
particularly egregious form of procedural unfairness, being both unpredictable and
inaccurate. They are forbidden in both federal, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and
state, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, governments. In its original form a bill of
attainder was simply a legislative act condemning a named person to death. See
C. WEDGEWOOD, THoMAs WENTwoRTH, FIRST EAR OF SMAFFORD (1962), for an excel-
lent account of its use by the long parliament to strip King Charles I of his lieuten-
ants in the prelude to the English Civil War. After the American Civil War the bill
of attainder clauses were used to nullify laws passed by Congress and the state of
Missouri to disqualify from certain occupations those who had participated in the
"late rebellion." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). Bills of attainder are unpredictable because
they are based on no articulated policy announced in advance of the acts which
cause the condemnation. They are inaccurate because no specific proof or other
truth guaranteeing safeguards of a judicial trial are used to establish the acts which
cause the condemnation. But calling these retroactive acts "bills of attainder" adds
nothing to analysis. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Except to show the deep Anglo-American commitment to
procedural regularity, reference to the bill of attainder clauses is not useful. See
Justice White's dissent in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. at 462.
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TERRITORIAL DUE PROCESS
In 1642, Coke's Second Institute, containing his commen-
tary on Magna Carta, was published by order of the House of
Commons. This commentary was greatly relied upon in contro-
versies between the colonies and the British government before
the Revolution and furnished much of the material for our
American Bill of Rights. It is a foundation document for the
history of our constitutional law. The part especially notewor-
thy is the long commentary on chapters 39 and 40 in which he
takes them up clause by clause and shows how they have been
interpreted and developed by legislation of Parliament, in the
law books, and by judicial decision. He considers the meaning
of lex terrae, "law of the land," and shows that as far back as
the reign of Edward H [1322-77] the phrase "due process of
law" was used as its equivalent. In other words, law in that
phrase meant more than an aggregate of laws, and due process
of law had much more than a merely procedural meaning. As
these phrases were put in our American constitutions by law-
yers who took the Second Institute for a legal Bible, this exposi-
tion needs to be remembered. * * * He explains the word "liber-
ties" as meaning more than freedom of the physical person from
arrest or imprisonment. But he shows that it had always been
construed to cover "the freedoms that men have."
2
Whatever the original or most obvious meaning is, it is now
clearly established that the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments3 have substantive as well as procedural
aspects, and that they are capable of being read to protect individ-
uals from the full range of potential governmental arbitrariness.
The following truncated rule may help illustrate the current range
of the phrase "due process of law":
When government affects an individual "due process"
guarantees that (1) the individual "is within" the jurisdictional
territory of the affecting government, (2) such government is
acting pursuant to a policy that is not arbitrary (i.e., is
"reasonable," "just" and "fair"),' (3) as manifested in a law
2 R. POUND, THE DEvELoPmENT OF CONsTrrurIONAL GuARANTEs OF LIBERTY 47-
48 (1957).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. COr4ST. amend. XIV. The fifth amendment has
been held to include an equal protection principle subsumed in the notion of due
process. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The fourteenth amendment has
long been held to include a no-taking-of-property-without-just-compensation prin-
ciple. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
My use of the words "reasonable," "just," and "fair" is meant to refer to
three distinct principles which deal with the arbitrariness of substantive policy,
each one of which will be the subject of an extended analysis. "Reasonable" refers
to the rationality principle currently analyzed as "substantive due process." "Just"
3
McLaughlin: Territorial Due Process: Analysis of an Emergent Doctrine
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
which is not (a) retroactive or (b) too vague to inform the aver-
age individual of what the policy expects of him or her and (4)
the method of applying the policy-manifesting law to individual
cases guarantees a level of mistaken applications low enough to
be acceptable under the circumstances.
For want of a better name, let's call our "rule" the short form
version of the doctrine of due process of law as that doctrine has
been developed by the Supreme Court. As a tool in itself for decid-
ing concrete cases, the short form verson is almost as unusable as
quoting the amendments in pure form. But hopefully it will help
the reader see due process whole and will serve as the touchstone
for further explication.
An outline of the projected set of articles follows:
A. Territorial Overreaching
B. Arbitrary Policy
1. The Rationality Principle
2. The Equality Principle






This article will begin the elaboration of due process doctrine with
a conceptual analysis of territorial overreaching.
refers to the equality principle which has given rise to the elaborate doctrine of
equal protection of the laws. A perfectly rational law may nonetheless be unjust.
"Fair'" refers to the expectations principle usually analyzed under the rubrics
"taking without just compensation" or "impairment of obligations of contract."
Again a law can be, with these definitions, rational and just but unfair. All this
Humpty-Dumptying (See L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss (1872)) about
the meaning of words is meant to point up an important fact about the use of
language in the due process area. It is characterized by imprecision and redun-
dancy. Courts say this law is "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" as if these
three words marked three different things wrong with the law. Such phrases should
be a red flag to any reader that articulate analysis has stopped (if it ever started)
and naked feelings or intuitions about the propriety of governmental action have
taken over. No commentary worthy of the name "scholarly" is guilty of such locu-
tions. I will do my best. If I should use a phrase like "arbitrary and capricious"
(which I will not) I will mean two distinct things such that some things could be
arbitrary but not capricious and vice versa.
[Vol. 81
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DuE PROCESS AND TERRITORIAL OVERREACHING
The idea of a doctrine of "territorial due process" separate
from "procedural due process" or "substantive due process" is
relatively new.- In fact, until very recently, the Supreme Court had
only rarely attached any identifying label to the words "due pro-
cess of law" when discussing its various applications.' Moreover,
I use the phrase "territorial due process" to identify all the due process
doctrine relating to territorial jurisdiction of government. The territorial jurisdic-
tion of government may be asserted in either its legislative or adjudicative capaci-
ties. Thus there is "legislative jurisdiction" and "adjudicative (or judicial) jurisdic-
tion." This seems to parallel two of the traditional three branches of government.
There is no "executive or administrative jurisdiction" relevant to the territorial
context. It would appear that in this context, at least, the traditional second branch
of government, the executive, is always acting as an adjunct to one of the two
governmental capacities-policy and law-making (legislative) and coerced policy
application (adjudicative). The executive branch is best contrasted with the other
branches not by the governmental capacity' or power it exercises but by its mode
of behavior. It does; the others think. Legislatures deliberate and make policy.
Executives apply the policy in the form of law. Where there is a dispute in applica-
tion, i.e., where coercion is necessary, another deliberative body, the courts, settle
the disputed application and order it applied, and again the actual application (e.g.
writ of execution, jailing) is carried out by the executive. The courts to a limited
extent also make policy, especially in common law countries. Territorial due pro-
cess applied to legislative jurisdiction is concerned with the fairness of the terri-
torial reach of a particular government's policy. More precisely stated, it is con-
cerned with the fairness of a government's policy as to "who" is subject to that
government's legislative policy. Territorial due process applied to adjudicative ju-
risdiction is concerned with the fairness of the territorial reach of its coercive
dispute-settling machinery. In a few instances issues as to both adjudicative and
legislative jurisdiction appear in the same case. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
The phrase "territorial due process" probably appears somewhere in the legal
literature but I cannot find it. I remember it being used by then Dean Frank Strong,
who taught constitutional law at Ohio State University College of Law when I was
a student there, although I cannot find the phrase in Dean Strong's book used in
the course. See F. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTrrUIONAL LAw (1950). A recent tele-
phone conversation with Dean Strong verified my remembrance; he was surprised
that his book made no use of the phrase. A recent note in the Harvard Law Review
refers to "the territorial conception of due process." 91 HARv. L. REv. 72, 82 (1977).
' Without doing exhaustive research on this perhaps not trivial trivia, I find
the earliest use of the phrase "substantive due process" by the Supreme Court to
be in 1973 in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 167 (1973). The first use I found of the phrase in legal literature was in a
student note in 1949. 24 IND. L. J. 451, 453 (1949). The phrase is in quotation marks
indicating a self-conscious use by the author. The next use I found was in the title
of an article by Professor Monrad Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due
Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950). Professor Paulsen's use of the
phrase was quite unselfconscious, yet of all the sources he cited (that I could track
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until 1945, territorial overreaching by state governments was
thought of as an aspect of the concept now labeled procedural due
process. A court with jurisdiction was part of the procedure one
down) in discussing substantive due process for some 28 pages, only the Indiana
Note, supra, used the phrase "substantive due process." Even an entire book on
substantive due process written in 1941 never used the phrase, although the author
spoke of the "substantive conception of the due process clause" and the
"substantive meaning of the due process clause." B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE
CONSTrrON 50, 82 (1942).
The phrase "procedural due process" was first used by the Supreme Court
(again as far as I am able to discover) in Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S.
343, 354 (1941), but was used again only rarely, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950), until Snaidach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339,
340 (1968) (Douglas, J.), and 342 (Harlan, J., concurring). The earliest use of this
phrase I found in the literature was in a title, W. Van Alstyne, Procedural Due
Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 368 (1963). Again, I
feel sure the phrase must have been used earlier, but I did not find it. In any event,
the doctrines preceded their now familiar labels by many years and the Supreme
Court has only recently used any adjective at all to qualify "due process." Why is
this so? I can only speculate. Perhaps the Court, unconsciously, wanted to foster
the illusion that due process is one grand monolithic idea.
As to whether this seeming trivia as to names is indeed trivial consider the
following. A recent article by Professor James A. Martin of the University of Michi-
gan, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976),
argues that "the full faith and credit clause provides a better analytical aid than
reference to due process concepts in analyzing and understanding leading deci-
sions." Id. at 186. The stated premise for this conclusion is that "[the full faith
and credit clause] incorporates established concepts of mutual respect among sov-
ereigns." Id. at 186. I have no quarrel with his stated premise. See text accompany-
ing notes 83-86, infra. I do disagree, however, with his conclusion quoted above that
full faith and credit yields a better rationale than due process for the results of
decided cases and with his final conclusion that due process is theoretically inade-
quate for limiting a state's choice of law. His conclusion is really based on a totally
inadequate concept of due process in the territorial context, a concept he labels
"substantive due process." Id. at 185, 192. In explaining why Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930), cannot be successfully rationalized in terms of due process, he
states that "[ajlthough the result has intuitive appeal, neither of the ordinary
meanings of due process-substantive or procedural fairness-seems to be involved
in Dick." Id. at 188. His explanation of Dick proves he has no idea that due process
could include territorial fairness or that it has in fact included territorial fairness
for some time. Labels do count. Since we have recently (in the last thirty years)
started labelling due process, and since we have come up with but two labels for
due process-substantive and procedural-it is easy enough to assume that due
process is of two kinds only, and that any use of due process must be one of the
two kinds. If the emerging doctrine of territorial fair play is to have further four-
teenth amendment development by the federal courts it needs its own label-
territorial due process (or jurisdictional due process)-else it will be confused with
the doctrines of the substantive fairness of laws, and thus distorted and shrunken
out of any usefulness.
[Vol. 81
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was due.7 Furthermore the laws of a state were of no effect and thus
not law outside its boundaries; therefore taking property in the
form of a tax or a penalty for acts done outside the state was a
taking without due process of law.' Note that in both the judicial
and legislative contexts just mentioned "no jurisdiction" comes
first and "no due process" follows from it. Territorial due process
as a doctrine distinct from procedural due process turns the propo-
sition around. "No jurisdiction, therefore no due process" is now
"no due process, therefore no jurisdiction."
This section on territorial due process has two aims: first, an
explication of the original doctrine that flowed from the "no juris-
diction, no due process" proposition, briefly exploring the problems
the original doctrine raised and the solutions attempted within the
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court's words are:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment ... the validity
of [no jurisdiction] judgments may be directly . . . resisted, on the
ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction
do not constitute due process of law. [The words "due process of law"]
when applied to judicial proceedings ... mean a course of legal proceed-
ings according to those rules and principles which have been established
in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of
private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a
tribunal competent by its constitution . . . to pass upon the subject-
matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the
personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdic-
tion by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.
Id. at 733.
" Id. at 720, 722-23 (citing D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850));
J. STORY, CONFLICTS OF LAw § 539 (7th ed. 1872). In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, the Court
had no fourteenth amendment on which to pin its refusal to allow full faith and
credit to be given a judgment against D'Arcy, who was not served with process and
did not appear in the judgment-rendering state. It reached the same result by
interpretation of the full faith and credit act of 1790 in light of the international
law as it existed among the states in 1790, which was "that a judgment rendered
in one State, assuming to bind the person of a citizen of another, was void within
the foreign State, when the defendant had not been served with process or voluntar-
ily made defence, because neither the legislative jurisdiction, nor that of courts of
justice, had binding force." The Court, finding "no evil in this part of existing law,
and no remedy called for," held that "Congress did not intend to overthrow the old
rule," by the act of 1790. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 176 (emphasis added).
It was not until 1897, however, that the court had occasion to use the fourteenth
amendment to hold a state law unconstitutional as applied because the governing
events were territorially beyond the state's legislative jurisdiction. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Later cases held acts in violation of due process
because their purpose was beyond the state's legislative jurisdiction delimited by
the "police power." See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7
McLaughlin: Territorial Due Process: Analysis of an Emergent Doctrine
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
original concept; second, an explication of the still developing
modem doctrine based on the opposite proposition, its solutions
to the old problems and the problems that are, as yet, unresolved.
The second part of this article will be an attempt to formulate and
justify some standards for solving territorial due process problems.
A. The Old Concept
The original concept of due process applied to territorial over-
reaching, "no jurisdiction, therefore no due process," made juris-
dictional concepts crucial. A concept of jurisdiction could be based
on an analysis of fairness in the territorial context, but for some
reason this did not occur to jurists in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Perhaps it was because jurisdictional concepts
were better developed than due process ideas of fairness, or
because due process was a quite mechanistic idea then and did not
suggest general notions of fairness. Or perhaps it was because the
proposition "no jurisdiction, no due process" made jurisdiction
seem prior to any idea flowing from due process itself, such that
defining jurisdiction in terms of fairness or justice would have
seemed circular-no fairness (due process), therefore no jurisdic-
tion, therefore no due process. That fairness was not crucial to the
development of jurisdictional concepts does not mean it did not
inform the idea; but fairness was not central Rather the idea
flowed from the simple (and apparently self-evident) notion that
"[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established."', This
meant "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
I See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877). "If, without personal
service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte against non-residents and ab-
sent parties, upon mere publication of process, which, in the great majority of cases,
would never be seen by the parties interested, could be upheld and enforced, they
would be the constant instrument of fraud and oppression." But "Islubstituted
service by publication ... may be sufficient to inform parties ... where property
is once brought under the control of the court by seizure" because the "law assumes
that property is always in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent. .. ."
Id. Ironically this notion of fairness (actual notice of the suit) is today considered
an essential aspect of procedural due process. Milligan v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940); Schnoeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); see Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The five elements of fairness relevant
to territorial due process do not include actual notice but do include planning
notice. See text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
,0 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
[Vol. 81
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over persons or property without its territority."" "[N]o tribunal
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as
to subject either person or property to its decisions."' 2 The Court
in Pennoyer v. Neff did concede that one state's actions "will often
affect persons and property [outside] it."'" No objection can be
taken "[t]o any influence exerted in this way," but "any direct
exertion of authority upon [extraterritorial people or property]"
is "usurpation."' 4
Thus jurisdiction meant direct physical control-a laying on
of hands as by service of process in the judicial context, or the
ability to seize land or chattels or arrest people inside the state in
either the judicial or legislative contexts. Almost forty years after
Pennoyer, Justice Holmes gave his vaunted "clarity" to the devel-
opment of the concept of jurisdiction: the "foundation of jurisdic-
tion is physical power."" Since one (including the agents through
which governments act) can only have physical power over things
physically present, jurisdiction turned on the presence of some-
thing physical at the time of assertion" of jurisdiction.
This concept answered most questions, though not all, for
some of the things over which governments assert jurisdiction are
abstractions, such as corporations, property interests, choses in
action, and relationships (e.g., marriage). But answers to these
problems were worked out by identifying what seemed the most
natural physical "thing" (person, land, or other object) with which
the abstraction was concerned. Thus property interests in land or
" Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
12 Id.
11 Id. at 723.
4 Id.
'1 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Ehrenzweig, The Transient
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L. J. 289, 296 (1956), criticizes the quoted Holmes statement as "factually unsup-
ported and functionally unsupportable."
11 "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times
it is not necessary to maintain that power throughout the proceedings properly
begun, and although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the
place of service upon the person." 243 U.S. at 91. Thus continuing physical presence
was not necessary. Moreover, even actual physical presence was not necessary if the
defendant was a resident at the time of assertion. Perhaps residents were felt to
have a kind of general presence even when temporarily absent from the state. In
any event, there seems to have been jurisdiction over an absent resident if a means
of notification that had a reasonable chance of actually notifying the defendant was
used, as was not the case in McDonald v. Mabee. See Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke
Co., 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 58, 61 (1873) (dictum).
9
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chattels were usually identified with the land or chattel, not the
person having the interest.'7 The land is the "property" in common
legal and lay parlance. In fact, the connection is so strong between
property and the objects of property that "property" is usually not
perceived as an abstraction at all.
Uninformed by any articulated idea of the arbitrariness of
territorial overreaching, this concept of "physical presence at the
time of assertion," or more fully, "physical presence of the most
natural connection with the basis of jurisdiction at the time of
assertion of jurisdiction" in many instances produced neither pre-
dictable nor just results. This failure was compounded by the fact
that there are four different general contexts of governmental ac-
tivity, and thus four different ways governments encounter juris-
dictional problems-four somewhat different opportunities for the
original jurisdictional concept to fail. The contexts are jurisdiction
to adjudicate, jurisdiction to tax, jurisdiction to regulate through
"public law," and jurisdiction to apply "private law.""'
The failures in the judicial area have been the most notice-
able. Here, the original concept of jurisdiction produced fairly pre-
dictable, but often arbitrary, results. Jurisdiction over persons was
both too broad and too narrow, while jurisdiction over property
often seemed just plain capricious. Claims completely unrelated to
17 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723-24, 727. See note 9 supra.
11 These contexts are sometimes referred to as "judicial jurisdiction" and
"legislative jurisdiction." See F. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTrrrIONAL LAW 1255
(1950); P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE, & E. BROWN, CONSTrrTONAL LAW
CASES AND OTHER PROBLEmS 455 n.2 (4th ed. 1977). See extended comment at note
5 supra. Legislative jurisdiction encompasses jurisdiction to tax and to regulate.
Regulation encompasses both "public law" regulation (criminal codes and other
statutory regulation in the public interest, with the state or its surrogate (e.g.,
private attorney general) as one party in any litigation involving its enforcement),
and "private law" regulation (statutory and common law regulation of private
relationships such as torts, contracts, property and trusts, with the state not a party
to litigation involving its enforcement). The territorial problems that arise in these
four contexts are taught in four different law school courses which are not generally
thought to have much overlap: judicial jurisdiction in a civil procedure course;
jurisdiction to tax in a course on state and local taxation or constitutional law;
jurisdiction to regulate (in the public areas) in a constitutional law course (occa-
sionally) or perhaps in an administrative law or regulated industries course; and
jurisdiction to regulate private relationships in a course in conflict of laws. In the
couits there is little cross citation of authority between the contexts in territorial
due process cases, as if they are four separate and distinct doctrines. The contexts
do create somewhat different problems but territorial issues have much in common
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the property could be adjudicated and a person's interest in such
property thereby extinguished without jurisdiction over the per-
son.19 Moreover, defining the location of intangible property such
as a debt, or stocks and bonds left defendants at the mercy of their
debtor's wanderlust" or of a corporation's often irrelevant place of
incorporation.
21
But the doctrine of jurisdiction over persons was hardest to
swallow, at least in theory. Any state a person was in, no matter
how fleetingly, could gain jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim
against him, however unrelated that claim was to the state, if
process was served during the fleeting passage.2 As a practical
matter, the transitory cause of action was seldom so abused, and
did serve occasionally as an antidote to the much greater injustice
caused by tortfeasors or contract breakers who moved away from
the state of the tort or contract. Because of the presence "at the
time of assertion" requirement of the old concept, the plaintiff in
such a situation would have to go to the defendant's new state to
sue unless the plaintiff could find him temporarily visiting or pass-
ing through his state or even a neighboring state and had the
foresight to have process waiting.
A solution to this too narrow reach of the old concept was
found for automobile torts by coupling the notion of consent that
was built into the original concept with the early perception of cars
as dangerous instrumentalities such that states could bar the use
"1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFUCr OF
LAWS § 66 (1971); Von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1139-41 (1966). This has traditionally been
called quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245-46 (1958). See Note,
Civil Procedure-Concepts of Personal Jurisdiction Before and After Shaffer v.
Heitner, 80 W. VA. L. REv. 285, 290 n.29 (1978). The recent case of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), merely calls it "in rem jurisdiction." Von Mehren and
Trautman would call it "limited general jurisdiction"-"limited" to the value of
the asset seized but "general" in that any claim against the owner can be adjudi-
cated no matter how unconnected with the forum state or the asset.
" Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); First Trust Co. v. Matheson, 187 Minn.
468, 246 N.W.1 (1932) (jurisdiction of intangible assets embodied in a document
are "present" where the document is); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLcr OF LAWS
§ 68 (1971).
22 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); State Tax Comm'n of Utah v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) (Utah allowed to exact inheritance tax on common
stock of Utah corporation when owner of stock had no other contact).
2 Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service over Arkan-
sas in non-stop flight from Tennessee to Texas).
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of cars on their highways, even to interstate travelers.n Therefore
a state could make motorists consent in advance to service of pro-
cess as a condition of using its roads." At first, any driver who
received a license to use the highways expressly had to authorize
the secretary of state to receive service of process as his attorney-
in-fact.2-n The ritual of actual service inside the state was felt to be
necessary to the physical control that was the precondition of juris-
diction. In 1927 the Supreme Court further fictionalized this
"voluntary" submission when it declared that a state could make
the act of driving on the highways an implied appointment of the
secretary of state as agent to receive service in suits growing out
of the use of its highways . 2 So it was that jurisdiction over the most
common and transient cause of tort actions came to satisfy justice
without destroying the original concept of jurisdiction.
This same fiction of "voluntary" submission had been used
earlier to obtain jurisdiction over corporate defendants who were
licensed to do business or doing business in the state. Since a
corporation is an abstract legal person composed of many physical
things, such as owners, managers, workers, land, other physical
property, and even some nonphysical things such as accounts re-
ceivable and good will, courts and legislatures have had great diffi-
culty "locating" it outside its state of birth. Thus courts usually
relied on presumed consent ("voluntary submission") to obtain
jurisdiction. Again this fiction started with the corporation's ac-
tual authorization of some in-state individual to act as its agent
for receipt of service of process,2 and evolved into a presumption
of such authorization.2 But the ritual of in-state service of process
was always required.2 1
"3 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
24 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
2 Id.
26 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
2 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856). However, since
the Supreme Court held in International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910),
that a state may not prevent a corporation from conducting purely interstate busi-
ness in its territory, it had no basis to coerce "consent to" service as a condition of
doing such business; so "presence" outside the state of incorporation had to be
allowed (contrary to the concept of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839), that a corporation only exists in the state of incorporation), and such pres-
ence was then found in the jurisdiction-asserting state. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) (presence not found); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Alexander, 227
U.S. 218 (1913) (presence found).
21 And still is required by the law of many states. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE
§§ 56-3-33(a) (1978 Cum. Supp.) (general long-arm statute), 56-3-31 (1978 Cum.
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In the legislative realm this ritual of process and its saving
fictions were irrelevant. "Presence" was necessary. A state taxed
the physical things within its boundaries that a corporation owned,
or taxed receipts from (and regulated) corporate "activities"
within the state. But the test for corporate presence under the
original doctrine looked not at corporate activity that touched the
state in relationship to the state's purpose in asserting jurisdiction
to determine whether such jurisdiction would be fair to all con-
cerned; rather the test was "mechanical or quantitative"-was the
activity "a little more or a little less." 0 In other words, a corpora-
tion was either "present" or not, regardless of the reasons for the
state's action or the fairness of its assuming jurisdiction.
"Presence" was a thing in itself. The jurists of that era would have
thought Chief Justice Stone's idea that a corporation is "present"
when it is fair to say it is "present" illogical-a putting-the-cart-
before-the-horse sort of nonsense.
But ideas evolve and in law they evolve in response to the felt
injustice produced by the existing concepts. Old concepts have
only so much flexibility; then they break. So it was with the old
jurisdictional due process concept. It occurred to Harlan Fiske
Stone, one of the great innovators of American jurisprudence, that
since the ultimate question is one of due process and due process
is a guarantee of fundamental fairness, the territorial problems
should be analyzed in terms of fairness. So in 1945, in announcing
a decision for a unanimous Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,31 he introduced the proposition, "no due process
therefore no jurisdiction," turning on its head a century of doc-
trine..3 2 Pennoyer and its progeny suffered a lingering death until
Supp.) (motorist long-arm statute); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-15 (1975 Replacement Vol.)
(corporation long-arm statute).
1 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The Court
cites International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1914) where
"a continuous course of business in the solicitation of.orders which were sent to
another state and in response to which the machines of the Harvester Company
were delivered within the state of Kentucky" was held to be "doing business" and
thus was sufficient "to manifest its presence" within the state and thus "to legiti-
mate service of process on it." 326 U.S. at 314.
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32 The Court in International Shoe does not use the phrase "no due process
implies no jurisdiction." That phrase is a way of summarizing the Court's reasoning
which concludes with the famous test:
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
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1977 when the Court in Shaffer v. Heitnery put it out of its misery.
It is now officially dead but not buried; so as these things usually
go, its carcass will litter the judicial landscape for some years to
come.
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In other words
asserted jurisdiction is constitutional if it is fair; that is, fairness (due process)
implies jurisdiction. The Court explains that "presence" was short hand for "those
activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." 326 U.S. at 317. The Chief Justice
there cited Judge Learned Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d
Cir. 1930). But until Judge Hand's explanation in Hutchinson, "presence" had not
followed from fairness but the other way around: presence implied jurisdiction
implied fairness. A careful reading of the pre-International Shoe cases clearly re-
veals this. Judge Hand was, of course, quite aware of this. He said:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation must be
"present" in the foreign state, if we define that word as demanding such
dealings as will subject it to jurisdiction, for then it does no more than
put the question to be answered.
We are to inquire whether the extent and continuity of what it has
done in the state in question makes it reasonable to bring it before one
of its courts. Nor is it anomalous to make the question of jurisdiction
depend upon a practical test . . . [I]t seems to us that nothing is gained
by concealing what we do by a word [presence] which suggests an inap.
propriate analogy, that is, the presence of an individual who may be
arrested and compelled to obey. This does not indeed avoid the uncer-
tainties, for it is as hard to judge what dealings make it just to subject a
foreign corporation to local suit, as to say when it is "present," but at
least it puts the real question, and that is something.
Id. at 141 (emphasis added). Thus Judge Hand had his (excuse the expression)
learned hand in this revolution too. What Hand calls a "practical test," i.e., saying
a word means such and such when it is reasonable in light of its purpose or function
in a particular doctrine to so say, is usually called the "functional" approach to law,
as opposed to the older "conceptual" approach-a word means what it means.
"Presence" as a concept, independent of fairness, means that something is physi-
cally in some space at some time. "Presence" as a "function" word in a legal
doctrine (aiming for justice) means what is "fair" under the circumstances to say
it means. Functionalism, though, does depend on concepts, but they are very basic
concepts, concepts at the very heart of legal life-fairness, justice, reasonableness.
Functionalism is a word for the process of analysis that goes to the very roots of a
legal question (e.g., from "Is there consideration for this promise?" to "Is this the
kind of promise that ought to be judicially enforced?"). Functionalism is the hall-
mark of twentieth century legal development. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATRE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROcEss 73 (1921), where the writings of Dean Pound are quoted. Judge
Hand and Justice Stone were two of the leading exponents of this "practical"
approach. It is not surprising then that they, working in tandem, fathered the
territorial due process revolution.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
[Vol. 81
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B. The New Concept
The new concept will in theory produce just results. It was
introduced to cure defects of fairness in the old concept. The ques-
tion is: does it introduce a new era of uncertainty that is as bad or
worse than the occasional unfairness of the old idea?4 If a concep-
tion of fairness is carefully and rigorously developed in the terri-
torial context, it should make for predictable as well as just results.
Four considerations come into play in developing a doctrine of
territorial fairness. First is the identification of the factors that
make territorial overreaching unfair. Second is identification of the
various societal interests promoted by government insofar as they
relate to territoriality. Third is the identification of the true nature
(looking past form to substance) of the legal interests subjected to
state jurisdiction. Finally, there is the ever-present problem of
judicial review, the question of the deference to be paid to the
decisions of nonjudicial institutions of government.
1. The five aspects of territorial unfairness
There are five different kinds of unfairness in the territorial
context: lack of general notice, lack of reciprocity, comparative
inconvenience, lack of representation, and divided allegiance.
These considerations have varying relevance depending on the par-
ticular context and on their utility in generating workable rules.
For instance, it would appear on first impression that "lack of
representation" should be an important factor in legislative con-
texts (remember the revolutionary cry "taxation without represen-
tation is tyranny"), but it seems that relative political clout or lack
of representation is an elusive factor incapable of generating line
drawing rules.
That these five aspects of territorial unfairness all relate to
presence can be readily seen: if you are in state Y and not in state
X, then you have no notice for planning purposes that X may exact
money or obedience from you; nor has X given you anything in
11 See Justice Black's words of concern in his concurring opinion in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington: "[The Court] has thus introduced uncertain
elements confusing the simple pattern .... 326 U.S. at 323. No other justice
concurred in his opinion. There were no other concurring opinions or any dissent
in International Shoe. Judge Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase had characterized the
.simple pattern" referred to by Justice Black: "It is quite impossible to establish
any rule from the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass."
45 F.2d at 142.
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terms of governmental services or other benefits for which it should
be compensated by money or obedience; nor will it be convenient
to go to X or obey its rules, especially if X is a long way from Y;
nor do you have any say in making the policies of X which you are
now asked to obey; and finally you must pay and obey Y which
may be inconsistent with doing X's bidding.
"General notice" does not refer to the notification of a specific
law suit or a particular demand for obedience; it does refer to a
general awareness of those governments to which one must be re-
sponsive. Without such awareness one cannot plan. This general
or "planning" notice is more akin to the notice consideration of
vagueness and retroactivity doctrines than to the procedural due
process requirement of specific notice of Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank. Specific notice protects one's interest in the accurate
application of law by allowing one to prepare and defend against
false charges of liability or guilt. General notice protects one's
interest in predictability. Territorial predictability completes the
predictability picture painted by prospectiveness of application
and clarity of language in legislation. It adds place to time and
meaning. Surprisingly, this general notice, guaranteeing at least a
modicum of territorial predictability, has only very recently been
identified by any Supreme Court Justice as an aspect of territorial
fairness, 36 although it had very likely intuitively informed prior
- 339 U.S. 306 (1950). For an early suggestion that this notice involved the
same problem as retroactivity, see Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, 28 U.
Cm. L. R. 258 (1961).
36 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 217, 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). After
citing Justice Black's opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington to the effect
that due process is a protection against "judgments without notice" (which to
Justice Black was the sole meaning of due process in this context), Justice Stevens
goes on to expand this requirement of specific notice to one of general notice:
The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning
that a particular activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign. If I visit another State, or acquire real estate or open a
bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the State will
exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My contact
with the State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks.
433 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). He goes on to condemn the Delaware law at issue
in Heitner on general notice grounds:
If its procedure were upheld, Delaware would, in effect, impose a duty of
inquiry on every purchaser of securities in the national market. For unless
the purchaser ascertains both the State of incorporation of the company
whose shares he is buying, and also the idiosyncrasies of its law, he may
be assuming an unknown risk of litigation.
I would also [in addition to where real estate is involved] not read
[Vol. 81
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decisions in each of the four contexts of jurisdiction. It or its first
cousin, "justifiable expectations," was offered by one commenta-
tor 7 as the chief underlying (but unstated) rationale in the choice
of law context, especially in such leading cases as Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick 38 and John Hancock Mutual Insurance Co. v. Yates.3
General notice is perhaps a slightly different concept than
"justifiable expectations" and its corollary "unfair surprise."40 The
phrase "justifiable expectations" suggests vested rights theories 1
which would make the concept too narrow and rigid in application.
Once the reasonable expectation of the application of the law of
one place is shown, the application of the law of some other place
is "unfair surprise" and automatically unconstitutional no matter
what the countervailing factors might be. Perhaps "justifiable ex-
pectations" also suggests that there must be specific proof of a
detrimental change of position in reliance on the expectation be-
fore there is unfair surprise,42 or if not a specific detrimental
change, at least a specific proven reliance, whether for accounting
purposes or simple peace of mind. 3 General notice is a broader and
more flexible concept meant to identify merely one of several ways
territorial overreaching is unfair. It is broad enough to include
various degrees of unfairness, from specific detrimental change of
it as invalidating other long-accepted methods of acquiring jurisdiction
over persons with adequate notice of both the particular controversy and
the fact that their local activities might subject them to suit.
Id. at 219 (emphasis added). For Justice Stevens, general and specific notice
seemed to combine to be the sole test of territorial due process. As was pointed out
in note 9, supra, specific notice is an aspect of procedural due process and does not
further the analysis of the territorial propriety of jurisdiction.
31 Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's
Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449, 455-61 (1959). See also R. LEFLAR, AMERiCAN
CONFLICTS LAW § 61, 121-22 (3d ed. 1977).
- 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
3 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
40 Weintraub, supra note 37, at 457.
41 Professor Weintraub does not suggest this, and in fact decries the "rigid
'vested rights' theorizing" which had resulted in the Dodge decision, New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918). Weintraub, supra note 37, at 458. But he
goes on to justify the results in several "vested rights" cases on the sole basis of
unfair surprise even though he is somewhat dubious of the results in such chestnuts
as Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Lands Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934). It
is his use of "unfair surprise" as a complete test that leads me to believe it could
easily become "rigid vested rights theorizing" in new dress.
42 Martin, supra note 6, at 189. Cf. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413, 420
(1955).
11 This seems likely to have been Professor Weintraub's meaning of the phrase
"justified expectations," as used in his article, supra note 37.
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position, to a vague, general lack of predictability," and flexible
to the point of its never being an exclusive litmus test of unconsti-
tutionality even where the unfairness of no general notice is partic-
ularly intense.
Reciprocity was first articulated as a general policy by Chief
Justice Stone-in International Shoe." However, it had been earlier
mentioned, quite frequently, in tax cases, and probably is talked
about more in cases upholding the state's action than vice versa."
Although it is true that one ought not to have to pay taxes for
something which has not benefited one, it is equally true that one
ought to pay for the benefits one does get. Avoiding a state's tax
collector or courts because of some technical "absence" when size-
able benefits could be attributed to activities within that state
became so transparently unfair that finally the courts took notice
of it. It is ironic that it was perhaps the unfairness to states (i.e.,
to a state's people acting both collectively as a tax collector to pay
for government and individually as plaintiffs in judicial actions)
of this avoidance when benefits had been conferred that was the
major impetus to reversal of the "no jurisdiction, therefore no due
process" proposition."
11 See Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), where Justice
Douglas uses the concept of an "ambulatory contract" to find the existence of what
I call general notice.
326 U.S. at 319-20.
48 See, e.g., Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 364-68 (1939) (Stone, J.); Wis-
consin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 449 (1940); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board, 347 U.S. 590
(1954); National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
11 That is the major underpinning of Justice Stone's rationale in Curry v.
McCanless, where he writes of "the highest obligation ... to contribute to the
support of the government whose protection she enjoyed." 307 U.S. at 370-71. The
fact that there would be double liability was apparently outweighed by this
"highest obligation." Thus the obverse side of the reciprocity factor outweighed in
this instance the factor I have called "divided allegiance." See text accompanying
notes 54-68, infra. In Curry v. McCanless and a companion case, Graves v. Elliott,
307 U.S. 383 (1939), Justice Stone, writing for the majority, concluded that double
taxation of intangibles is at least minimally fair (i.e., fair enough for due process
purposes), 307 U.S. at 373, because, unlike tangibles, id. at 364, intangibles enjoy
the protection of more than one state since intangible property is really a relation-
ship between two or several people who may be in different states, id. at 367-72.
Taxes are payments for the services and order that government provides. If one
benefits from the services and order of more than one state it is only fair to pay
each state. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 96 (1929). The dissents of Justice Butler (in
McCanless) and Chief Justice Hughes (in Graves) are not responsive to Justice
[Vol. 81
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The third aspect to fairness-comparative inconvenience or,
as the Court has stated, an "estimate of inconveniences" 48-is es-
pecially pertinent in the adjudicative jurisdictional context.
There, Professor Ehrenzweig maintains, a general doctrine of
forum conveniens should prevail.49 Inconvenience may have some
pertinence in the use tax area also. 0
The final two elements of fairness, representation and divided
allegiance, only hover in the background of expressed doctrine de-
Stone's argument. They have assumed the old due process model: no presence
implies no jurisdiction implies no due process. Justice Stone is working toward the
new model-no fairness (or reasonableness) implies no due process implies no juris-
diction-that he finally articulates in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). See note 32 supra. The Stone and Butler opinions in McCanless
provide a vivid contrast of the functionalist versus conceptualist approach to the
elaboration of legal doctrine.
11 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)(quoting
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)). See also McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, Chief Justice Warren stated:
Those restrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga-
tion .... However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tri-
bunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had
the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its
exercise of power over him.
Id. at 251. Although the Chief Justice's quoted remarks smack of the conceptualism
of the pre-International Shoe era with "minimal contacts" merely a new phrase for
"presence" in the old formulation, and are thus completely at odds with the spirit
and substance of the International Shoe opinion of Chief Justice Stone, the re-
marks, nonetheless, remind us of a valid point that is in keeping with the spirit of
International Shoe: inconvenience is only one of several factors in the calculus of
territorial fairness.
41 Ehrenzweig, supra note 15, especially at 312-14. Professor Ehrenzweig
closed this most influential article on the following optimistic (or perhaps merely
wishful) note:
Once jurisdiction over nonresidents, no longer tied to the shibboleth of
"physical" service within the state, has embraced mail, wire and wireless
all through the nation in giving notice of a suit in a convenient court
having contacts with the case, there will be no need for "physically"
catching an elusive defendant, nor for protecting him against an incon-
venient forum. And pseudo-medieval formulas established and perpetu-
ated by nineteenth century conceptualism, which for decades have ob-
structed the free flow of legal progess, will have been replaced by what
may become known as the new and old American common law of inter-
state venue in the forum conveniens.
Id. at 313-14.
11 See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-
60 (1967).
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spite the fact that both elements have given rise to ringing slogans
which ordinarily indicates emotional commitment to the ideal:
"taxation without representation is tyranny" and "a man cannot
serve two masters." But as pointed out above, "representation"
seems never to be mentioned in territorial due process cases."' No
individual voter has a detectable, let alone measurable, impact on
the policy of any government. Moreover, corporations do not vote
at all. In fact, voting is only a small part of the potential political
clout of an individual and especially of a corporation. Political
clout does not necessarily require presence, but it does require
notice that one may be affected by the legislative policy of a state.
Therefore the general notice requirement of territorial due process
will in part cover representation. On the other hand, neither pres-
ence nor the right to vote are irrelevant to influence. But again,
relative influence is as immeasurable as the influence of one vote
is undetectable. Thus there is the nagging feeling that it should
count in the calculus of fairness but that it cannot be counted and
therefore as a practical matter cannot count. In other words, it
counts theoretically but not practically.2 Does this mean it ought
31 Cf. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 99 S.Ct. 383 (1978). By a 6.3 vote
the Court upheld a state law resulting in regulation without representation in an
intrastate context. The court treated it as primarily an equal protection voting
rights case. A municipality's police territory extended three miles beyond its corpo-
rate (thus voting) limits. But three things serve to weaken this case as authority in
the territorial due process context: (1) its intrastate nature (the "disenfranchised"
could vote in the state elections), in which the municipality is an agent of the state
sovereign completely subject to its control, unlike the relationship a state bears to
the federal sovereign-co (if not equal) sovereigns; (2) the extra-territorial regu-
lation was not thought to be particularly burdensome, id. at 391 n.8 and at 394
(Stevens, J., concurring); and (3) the practice, under judicial scrutiny, is wide-
spread, and tampering with the mild form of the practice in this case would neces-
sarily invalidate most of these schemes, thus burdening the federal courts with
tasks of judicial supervision far beyond their competence or present means. Id. at
391 & 391 n.8.
52 See Britton, Taxation Without Representation Modernized (pts. 1-2), 46
A.B.A.J. 369, 373-74, 526 (1960). To Mr. Britton, the great theoretical fault of all
extra-territorial taxation could be summarized by the phrase "taxation without
representation." He does not suggest that identifying this fault helps in drawing
lines between what is extra-territorial and thus not taxable and what is not extra-
territorial and thus taxable. Extra-territoriality is apparently a self evident con-
cept, as "presence" was to the pre-International Shoe judges.
For cases in which the Court upheld taxation of income earned in-state by non-
residents, see Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); New York ex rel. Whitney v.
Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937). No mention of taxation sans representation is made
in either case. Of course, if the tax does not discriminate, in-state residents can be
relied on to protect the out-of-state interests. Taxes that discriminate against non-
residents are highly suspect. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. at 58.
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to be ignored entirely, to be eliminated from the recital of factors
of territorial fairness? No. Lack of representation is one of the
things that intuitively and logically makes territorial overreaching
seem unfair. Although it could only clumsily be entered in the
calculus of actual rules of decision, it hovers in the background,
reminding the judicial decisionmaker that there is yet more un-
fairness in territorial overreaching than accounted for in his calcu-
lus.
Divided allegiance is a more useful element of fairness. It has
special relevance in the context of public regulation and taxation.
Double taxation, however, once a source of judicial censure" and
perhaps a form of divided allegiance, 54 has lost its ability to cause
0 Farmers' Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209-12 (1930) (overruling
Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903)), and First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S.
312, 326-27 (1932), are the highwater marks of such censure.
11 Divided allegiance in its strongest form is mutually exclusive allegiance. The
act of obeying one master is disobeying the other. Conceptually, at least, escheat
cases are the perfect example. If a state orders someone to give unique property X
to it in the face of a similar order from another state, the bind is clear. As a practical
matter, when escheat involves intangible assets represented by a debt in a dollar
amount the cases do not appear to be clearly mutually exclusive. Appearance of
mutual exclusiveness is not salient. But it is there. On the other hand, tax liability
to one jurisdiction is not necessarily inconsistent with tax liability to another.
Justice Holmes might have characterized most double taxation as being asked not
to serve two masters, but to pay two servants. See his dissenting opinion in Farmers'
Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 216-18 (1930), for instance. Some seeming
mutual exclusiveness, such as in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959), and Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978), are
logically only inconvenience, albeit gross inconvenience. See text accompanying
notes 48-50, supra.
In Bibb the act of obeying the Illinois mudflap law was not itself a violation of
the Arkansas law because the obedience of each law was limited to in-state trucks.
They could stop at the border and change mudflaps. Both Bibb and Raymond
Motor were decided on commerce clause grounds. The inconsistency caused an
inconvenience that in light of the law's speculative contribution to highway safety
was adjudged to be an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
A weaker form of divided allegiance is probably what the biblical expression
"[no man can serve two masters" has reference to, viz.: a servant is expected to
give undivided effort for and loyalty to his master. Matthew 6:24 (King James). In
this sense if one state is my master, I should pay all that I am able to pay to him
and obey only his commands. But the relationship of citizen (including corporate
entities) to state is surely not that of servant to master in that biblical sense.
A weaker form of divided allegiance that is relevant is "inconsistent alle-
giance," by which I mean something more than mere inconvenience in obeying two
state laws. Inconsistent allegiance occurs when commands are not technically mu-
tually exclusive but are sufficiently inconsistent that full compliance with both is
so difficult as to seriously jeopardize full compliance with the nonparty state's
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judicial outrage. " Multiple taxation, if seen as an evil at all, is
forbidden because it violates commerce clause policy, not due pro-
cess." There were three lines of argument in cases condemning
double taxation: it is illogical; it is bad policy; and it lacks reci-
procity. It is illogical because nothing can be in two places at once,
including the subjects of taxation. 7 It is bad policy because it is
oppressive (the tax bill is huge); it is discriminatory (intrastate
subjects pay only once); and it breeds conflicts between states."
It lacks reciprocity in that one or the other of the two taxes must
be on an extraterritorial subject for which one taxing state has
provided no protection. That state cannot ask for payment for that
which it has not provided."
command if the party state's law is obeyed. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 401
(1939); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939).
- Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 373-74 (1939); State Tax Comm'n of Utah
v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181 (1942) (overruling First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S.
312 (1932)). This was a return to the rule that there is no constitutional bar to
double taxation of intangibles. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1877).
0 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Barrett, State Taxation of Inter.
state Commerce-"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," Or What Have You?, 4
VAND. L. Rav. 496 (1951).
51 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312,326-27 (1932) (tax by state
of incorporation on transfers by death of shares of stock of a non-domiciliary estate).
In its application to death taxes, the rule rests for its justification upon
the fundamental conception that the transmission from the dead to the
living of a particular thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is an event
which cannot take place in two or more states at one and the same time.
• . . [11n the case of intangible property, it must be rejected as involving
an inherent and logical self-contradiction. Due regard for the processes
of correct thinking compels the conclusion that a determination fixing the
local -situs of a thing for the purpose of transferring it in one state, carries
with it an implicit denial that there is a local situs in another state for
the purpose of transferring the same thing there.
Id. (emphasis added). The quoted reasoning is the epitome of conceptualistic argu-
ment. See note 32 supra. Earlier cases had used this reasoning with tangible prop-
erty only. See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Railroad Co. v. Jackson,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868).
5" See, e.g., Farmers' Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209-12 (1930).
51 See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). The
taxation of tangible personal property is unfair because "[s]ubject to these indi-
vidual exceptions, the rule is that in classifying property for taxation some benefit
to the property taxed is a controlling consideration. . . .It is often said that protec-
tion and payment of taxes are correlative obligations." Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented.
[Vol. 81
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Except with the tangible subjects of property,"' these argu-
ments no longer add up to unconstitutional unfairness.6' Three
things conspired to defuse double taxation as a cause of constitu-
tional alarm: (1) The Holmesian view of minimal constitution-
alism-constitutional fairness is fundamental,12 not optimal, fair-
ness; (2) the growing realism in the use of legal concepts led by
Harlan Fiske Stone; and (3) probably a greater sympathy with
the political policy of modem taxation-its somewhat egalitarian
impetus. 4 Nonetheless, double taxation, even of intangibles, raises
cW Mr. Justice Stone was careful to distinguish the tangible property cases
when breaking with the Court's recent past in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357,
363-66 (1939). He found the reciprocity argument pursuasive as to tangibles. Id. at
364.
'I See cases cited in note 55 supra, as well as the dissents of Justices Stone and
Holmes in the cases cited in note 53 supra. But see Mr. Justice Jackson's vigorous
dissent in State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185 (1942).
62 Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74
(1905) is the keynote of this attitude which came to fruition in the late thirties. See
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Justice Cardozo's introduction of
the phrase: rights that are "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty");
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). In Union Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905), Justice Holmes' laconic dissent surely pointed
the way: "the result reached by the Court probably is a desirable one, but I hardly
understand how it can be deduced from the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 211.
The seeds of this attitude can be seen in 0. HoLmEs, THE COMMON LAw 131-32 (M.
Howe ed. 1963). Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in State Tax Comm'n of Utah
v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 182, 184-85 (1942), summarizes this policy of reluctant
judicial review.
See, e.g., Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-69 (1939). This realism
allowed the Court to see that the subjects of taxation (things, events, relationships)
could be "in" more than one place; that more than one state, therefore, could render
protection and benefits for which they could demand tax payments. Id. at 370-71.
See notes 47, 54 supra.
61 The older philosophy was that one should pay taxes in proportion to the
benefits and protection one received from government, and since the benefits one
received were in direct proportion to one's wealth then one should pay a fixed
proportion in taxes (if twice as rich then pay twice as much). See Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 203 (1905). But double taxation upset the
proper proportions (if twice as rich and in two states then pay four times as much).
A philosophy, based on the marginal utility of the dollar, of graduating taxes
according to ability to pay was gaining ground in the thirties. Ironically Justice
Jackson cited "the graduation of tax burdens" which "progessive modern taxation
strives to heed" as a reason for invalidating double taxation. State Tax Comm'n of
Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 196 (1942). But once the proposition "if twice as rich,
then pay more than twice as much," is admitted as valid then the question of how
much more apparently requires a subjective judgment based in part on one's egali-
tarian impulse as well as economic factors-a judgment in the legislative realm of
policy. The old philosophy could be reduced to a clear neutral principle and thus
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a basic question of fairness since property located "in" several
states will be subject to multiple taxation even though the prop-
erty receives the benefit of the same total of government services
as property located in only one state." However, the Court in line
with the Holmesian view will not use the blunt instrument of con-
stitutional adjudication to draw the fine lines necessary to the
excision of the unfairness. Consequently, the taxpayer must resort
to other legal avenues, such as reciprocal statutes, which will be
capable of drawing the fine lines necessary to delineate the tax
burden according to the proportionate amount of government serv-
ices in each state that benefit such property subject to multiple
taxation."
constitutionalized. The new philosophy cannot be reduced to principle except one
containing a clear policy choice. It cannot be constitutionalized. In Aldrich, the net
estate was worth $87,000,000. The subject of the tax was worth $1,000,000. Id. at
195. The "chaos," id. at 196, of multiple taxation of such estates must have seemed
to people of the new tax persuasion to have created a very small risk of unfairness
and was surely not lacking in that "fundamental fairness" that the Holmesian view
dictated for constitutional relief.
11 Thus no matter what tax philosophy one has, multiple taxation does seem
discriminatory against interstate transactions and activities: the same wealth is
taxed more if interstate than if intrastate. But again, the felt unfairness is diluted
by the nature of graduated tax philosophy-inordinate wealth is taxed not in pro-
portion to its extent, but in proportion to its inordinance. "Inordinance," being a
highly subjective notion, varies from place to place and time to time depending on
the polity's egalitarian impulse and economic evaluation. See note 64 supra. The
point is that graduated tax policy made a kind of variable, multiple taxation the
norm. If great wealth is already taxed at a rate three, five, or seven times the rate
of an ordinary person or estate, then a little higher multiple is not remarkable-
graduation policy has numbed our outrage at multiple taxation. We do it as routine
policy. Moreover, we probably never really see the same wealth being treated differ-
ently because of multiple taxation. Furthermore, interstate transactions may be
more complex and consume more government services over the same period than
comparable intrastate transactions. Thus if double taxation has evolved from
"serving two masters" to "paying two servants" to "paying two servants one wage"
to "paying two servants one and a fraction wages," it is still felt not quite fair to
pay two servants two wages for less than two servant-day's work. This is attested
to by the fact that only a "small minority of states do tax such intangibles and
provide for no exemption." Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 8 Uniform Laws Anno-
tated 255 (UNIFORM INTERSTATE ARBITRATION OF DEATH TAXES Acr). As of the end of
1976, 16 states had adopted the ARBITRATiON OF DEATH TAXES ACr and 19 states had
adopted the UNIFORM INTERSTATE ARBITRATION OF DEATH TAXES ACr. 8 Uniform Laws
Annotated (Pocket Part) 72, 74 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
" But reciprocal statutes, uniform acts and now the federal interpleader stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, should spell relief from multiple taxation, at least, at death.
See Appendix following this article discussing Justice Stewart's suggestive opinion
in California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601 (1978), concerning the use of the federal inter-
pleader statute in this context.
[Vol. 81
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Double escheat is another matter. Double escheat means dou-
ble liability for the very same obligation. Because escheat is simply
the sovereign's claim of priority as against the holder of essentially
abandoned assets, the claims of more than one state cannot be
justified by claiming that more than one state gave benefits for
which escheat is payment. Escheat does not purport to be pay-
ment, but is merely priority of claim, a windfall for the sovereign.
All agree that double escheat is constitutionally unfair. 7 Finding
the remedy has been the problem. Because the conflict is essen-
tially between two states with the interest of the individual being
that of a stakeholder in an interpleader action, use of the federal
interpleader action seems in order. 8
" Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), ordered
Pennsylvania to dismiss its claim for escheat of certain intangibles because New
York had just as plausible a claim of jurisdiction over the "res," and the Pennsyl-
vania court had no jurisdiction over New York to bind it personally; therefore
Western Union could not be protected from double escheat, which would be a denial
of due process of law. Compare Western Union with Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S.
541 (1948), and Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). The
results of these cases might be reconciled on two slim factual bases: (1) in the latter
three cases the escheating state had at least a slightly better claim to jurisdiction
over the res than in Western Union and (2) the non-forum states with plausible
escheat claims were not then pressing them as New York was in Western Union.
But, perhaps the better explanation for the different results is a shift in the concep-
tualization of jurisdiction. In the latter three cited cases, it was assumed that there
was valid jurisdiction (physical power plus, in the 1948 and 1951 cases, sufficient
contacts with the transaction-an emerging notion) over the thing (abandoned
monies or corporate stock) being escheated such that there was little danger of
double escheat. In the 1923 case a unanimous Court through Justice Brandeis spoke
squarely in terms of the established categories of jurisdiction; since the bank de-
posit was "in" the bank the state court had in rem jurisdiction and the bank was
protected should the depositor later appear-the state now had "custody" of the
deposit. In its terms the opinion makes sense. The 1948 and 1951 cases make less
sense. By then the old Pennoyer jurisdictional concepts were less convincing. Even
less convincing yet was the reification of abstract interests which application of the
Pennoyer categories to intangible property required. With reification a state could
take exclusive "custody" of an intangible interest much as it would take custody
of a car, boat or diamond. This custodial concept obviates double liability. By 1948
(three years after International Shoe but sans Justice Stone's leadership) the Court
was in conceptual transition. It still is.
" In this context the Court has twice exercised its original jurisdiction to settle
disputes between states. Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972) (the sequel
to Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961)); Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965). See also California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601 (1978). But
the comments of Justice Stewart et al in the latter case (see Appendix following
this article) suggest that federal interpleader is now the best remedy for the private
party faced with the Western Union problem of potential double escheat. Moreover,
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2. Societal interests protected by "territorial policy"
What state interests does territorial policy protect? With re-
gard to adjudicative jurisdiction the state is primarily interested
in providing a convenient forum for local citizens to vindicate their
rights. 9 Where the events or some of the events giving rise to a
cause of action arose within the state, the state has an additional
interest in seeing that its laws are faithfully interpreted and ap-
plied to the in-state part of the transaction." With regard to legis-
lative jurisdiction the state has an interest in making outsiders pay
taxes for general benefits and opportunities they receive from the
state's being an orderly community guaranteed and protected by
a costly government.7 It has an interest in protecting its citizens
from the relative "unknownness" of outsiders (i.e., we know less
about such things as the honesty, solvency, carefulness, and
healthiness of outsiders). 2 And, of course, it has the usual state
interest in controlling events occurring inside the state for the
general benefit of everyone within its borders.73 This involves terri-
toriality where the events of a legal transaction or cause of action
occur in several states.
All the above interests concern in-state activities of outsiders,
or the in-state effects of out-of-state activities, or in-state activities
tied closely to out-of-state activities. A state's laws seeking to pro-
tect such in-state interests may have an incidental extraterritorial
effect which, if great enough, could cause the law to be territorially
unconstitutional. But no one could deny that the interests the
state sought to protect were legitimate; they could only deny that
the rule for the division of intangibles among escheat claimants which was estab-
lished in Texas v. New Jersey and rigidly followed in Pennsylvania v. New York is
so clear and simple that few disputes ought ever to arise.
" McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
11 It should be noted that the state's interest in faithful application of its laws
is nbt the same as the legislative interest in having local policy apply to local events.
Here, assuming local policy controls the events, the interest is in faithful translation
of general policy into concrete decisions. As used in this context, "faithful" repre-
sents both knowledge of local law (policy), and willingness or desire to apply it
accurately. It is generally assumed that local courts will have this knowledge and
desire in greater measure than foreign courts.
71 See notes 46 and 47 supra.
72 See, e.g., Osborn v. Ozbin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940). See also Hanson v. Denkla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958), for a brief discussion of a state's interest in regard to
"exceptional" activity subject to special regulations.
11 This is the interest distinguished in note 70 supra.
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the means of protection were not appropriate under the circum-
stances. On the other hand, does a state ever have a legitimate
interest in simply projecting its power into other states?74 Motive
there might be for such projection in the normal human desire for
power and control. The corollary to this desire is a feeling that
"'our" power, "our" control will ultimately bring the greatest bene-
fit, that is, that "our" exercise of power is the most moral or based
on the "highest" or "most natural" moral rules. A state may natu-
rally then feel that it has a moral duty, a kind of mission, to extend
its enlightened policy beyond its borders. Nations surely feel this
way about their political philosophies. 5 States of our union no
doubt feel the same, albeit with less grand purposes (for example,
abolition of common law marriage, industrial safety, limitation on
actions). But such a "better law" purpose seems entirely illegiti-
mate. 6 It is provincialism of the purest form. Provincialism is
acceptable in the province but not in the nation composed of that
province and others. Among co-equal states in a federal union a
"better law" theory can have no place in developing a federal
judicial policy of territorial due process oversight. It might make
sense, however, if Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co." were overruled and all choice of law doctrine became federal
law by authorization of the full faith and credit clause. Then fed-
eral courts or state courts under ultimate federal review in the
Supreme Court could pick the "better rule" as a matter of federal
law. But even then the inherent uncertainty and subjectiveness of
the "better rule" inquiry make it highly suspect as a useful tool.
3. Nature of interests subjected to jurisdiction
The third consideration in developing a doctrine of territorial
due process is the "true" nature of legal interests and entities
subjected to judicial and legislative jurisdiction. Obvious as a be-
ginning point of analysis is to recognize that all roads of inquiry
must lead to people-real flesh and blood human beings. What
persons will be affected by the assertion of jurisdiction and how
"' See the discussion in Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law,
61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 188-90 (1976).
11 Exemplifying this phenomena is America's foreign policy often based on
evangelical democracy and the Soviet Union's policy based on evangelical commun-
ism. Can it not be said that most individuals believe their own ideas of basic
fairness have universal validity?
7, See, e.g., Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CALTF. L. REv. 1584 (1966). See also Martin, supra note 74, at 194-95.
- 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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will they be affected? There are abstractions on abstractions on
abstractions in the world of ownership and creditor interests in
corporations. But ultimately only people can own; ultimately only
people can be treated unfairly." A corporation's "people" are its
owners, its creditors, its directors or trustees (fiduciaries), its
agents and its other employees. Treating a corporation fairly is to
treat these people fairly. Any analysis that looks for an abstract
corporate "presence" is on a fool's errand, unless such declaration
is but a summarizing conclusion of analysis based on the fairness
of subjecting certain people's interests to jurisdiction."
Physical presence of people is not irrelevant, of course; nor is
the physical presence of real estate and other physical things in
which people have property irrelevant. Moreover, the physical
presence of tangible evidence of debt or credit or ownership is not
irrelevant, especially where transfer of ownership is effected by
transfer of the evidence of debt or ownership, as with a negotiable
promissory note, chattel paper or stocks and bonds. Physical pres-
ence of things that can be physically present is generally crucial
to fairness, although the physical presence need not be as of the
time jurisdiction is asserted as in the pre-International Shoe era.
The important lesson of the post-International Shoe cases is to
avoid reifying the abstract and to avoid finding the physical pres-
ence of things without physical existence. Courts used to (and still
do, occasionally) find a status "present," a relationship "present,"
or a corporation "present," not as a concluding metaphor but as
premise to a conclusion.
The physical connection to a state could also come from physi-
cal things other than people or owned things. For example, the fact
that products are sent into a state may make it fair to bring in the
producer under some circumstances."9 The means of communica-
7 See Note, Civil Procedure-Concepts 6f Personal Jurisdiction Before and
After Shaffer v. Heitner, supra note 19, at 296-97 n.61 (1978). See also Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
' See First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 329 (1941).
'o See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). In Gray, a device was made in Ohio and sold and shipped to Pennsyl-
vania where it was incorporated into another product. This product later appeared
in Illinois, where it malfunctioned, causing injury to the plaintiff. Illinois judicial
jurisdiction was upheld. Compare O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194
A.2d 568 (1963) (almost identical facts as Gray but jurisdiction denied), and Taylor
v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967) (a very weak con-
tact-Miss Taylor might have known that her amorous antics off screen would hurt
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tion with buyers or potential buyers (including telephone, radio,
television or catalogues) are physical contacts of the seller. They
all should count. How much is another matter."'
Finally there is an interest the locus of which may be discov-
ered without reduction to its physical parts, although it generally
entails a myriad of physically locatable acts. This is the interest
of the state of creation of legal interests: e.g., the state of incorpo-
ration, the state of entrustment. That state often will be the state
whose law governs the transaction as a matter of choice of law
doctrine, independent of any constitutional constraints on such
doctrine.82 Where it is determined by choice of law doctrine that a
audience size in Oregon for her film, "Cleopatra"). There is a plethora of cases in
the products liability area concerning proper jurisdiction, most of which turn on
notions of "general notice" discussed in text accompanying notes 35 to 44, supra.
"1 After comparing cases such as Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (judi-
cial jurisdiction), and Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (legislative
jurisdiction), with cases like McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957) (judicial jurisdiction), and Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (legis-
lative jurisdiction), one can conclude that the element of deliberateness is impor-
tant to territorial fairness. Although not articulated in the cases, deliberateness
seems to be related to general notice. If an individual should know with reasonable
probability that his deliberate acts will have consequences in a foreign state, then
he has general notice that he might be subject to the policies of those states. What
the Court has emphasized has been the relationship of deliberateness to reciprocity.
If one deliberately goes into a state and reeps the benefits of the state, it is fairer
to exact a payment in return (in the form of taxes or obedience), than if one is swept
in by events beyond his control, or by outcomes that are, at best, highly contingent.
This proposition has a certain intuitive appeal. It is also analogous to quasi-
contract doctrines. But if one willingly accepts benefits, whether passively or ac-
tively, it seems fair (or at least, not fundamentally unfair) to exact a compensation
where no altruistic motive is implied in the giving. In any event, deliberateness
seems very important to fairness. The presence of products or catalogues in a state
or communications into a state are factors from which deliberateness can be in-
ferred. But the strength of the inference depends on the surrounding circumstances.
It would make for sounder analysis if general notice itself were inferred from the
presence of these things rather than deliberateness. Reciprocity is better plugged
into the jurisdictional calculus as the simple question, "have benefits been con-
ferred," without regard to the beneficiaries' acts. Remember that general notice is
only one element of fairness. See National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), where general notice was clearly present since sales cata-
logues were sent into the state. But lack of benefits (though this is disputable) and
great inconvenience (see note 48 supra) tipped the scales against jurisdiction even
to exact a compensated collection of a use tax. General Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 355 (1944). In general, these use tax cases and interstate tax
cases are further complicated by a commerce clause doctrine that is not kept sepa-
rate from the due process doctrine in the Court's discussion. See note 54 supra.
12 See In re Bauer's Trust, 14 N.Y.2d 272, 200 N.E.2d 207, 251 N.Y.S.2d 207
(1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICT OF LAWS § 302, Comment e.
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particular state's law governs, then that state's interest in having
its laws faithfully and accurately appliedn makes the nonconstitu-
tional choice of law determination relevant to the constitutional
calculus of the territorial jurisdiction of courts. Of course due pro-
cess is a question of minimum fairness to individuals, not to states,
but the interest of the state asserting jurisdiction is relevant to an
appraisal of that fairness. Such fairness is, overall, a function of
the balancing of the individual's interest measured by the five
factors of territorial fairness versus the state's interest" in asserting
jurisdiction. Moreover, where choice of law doctrine points to the
law of a state other than the one asserting jurisdiction, that other
state's interest should count on the individual side against the
state asserting jurisdiction in the following sense: if such interest
in faithful application is definitely located outside the forum state,
then at least it cannot be counted as part of the interest of the
jurisdiction asserting state. Moreover, its location outside the state
may be an indication of unfairness to the individual of the jurisdic-
tion asserted." Nonetheless, it is worthy of careful note that the
other state's interest is only counted insofar as it affects the indi-
vidual's interest and not for itself. 6 If the importance to the other
state of its interest were counted in the balance, it would change
the concept of territorial due process from one of "minimal terri-
torial fairness to the individual of jurisdictional assertions," to one
" See note 71 supra.
' The "state's interest" means, of course, the collective interest of the people
of the territory as well as the special interest of the particular individual or individ-
uals who may have invoked the state protection causing it to assert jurisdiction.
11 For example, the person who is served with process while temporarily in a
state to answer to a lawsuit having nothing to do with his temporary or any former
presence will, in addition to his arguments of general surprise, inconvenience and
lack of reciprocity, be able to add the injustice of a relatively ignorant and indiffer-
ent court applying foreign state policies. See note 70 supra. Cf, Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 644-46 (1964)(citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
509 (1947)).
" Professor Martin contends that because the full faith and credit clause does
call for the balancing of a sister-state's interest, it is a more appropriate vehicle
than due process for settling territorial conflicts in the conflict of laws context.
However, the sister-state's interest does count for the individual in the sense de-
scribed above in the due process calculus. Moreover, fairness between individuals
and the state is ultimately what courts are appropriately concerned with, not fair-
ness as between states. Perhaps that is why in cases such as Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), and Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964), the Court seemed much more interested in discussing the due
process aspect of the problem than full faith and credit, where both were applicable.
See Martin, supra note 74.
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of optimal jurisdictional location. Such a conceptual change would
entail a shift of power from state to federal government that would
overwhelm the federal courts.
4. Deference to nonjudicial decisions
At last we come to the problem of deference. What deference
must be paid the judgment of legislatures and executives as to
jurisdictional policy? Deference has and will vary from context to
context and even from case to case within the four general con-
texts. Two generalizations about past court behavior with regard
to deference are probably safe. First, the Court has said little about
it, only occasionally making a passing reference that implies that
deference to legislative judgment has influenced their judgment.87
The other safe generalization is that, in the context of adjudicative
jurisdiction, the Court pays no deference and recognizes no issue
as to deference. This is probably because legislative standards
have usually been general or ill-defined, implying a delegation of
this policy making to the judiciary." Unselfconsciously, courts
made this policy by developing the received jurisdictioral con-
cepts. If the organ for making a particular state policy is its courts,
the Supreme Court in its reviewing capacity will hardly feel it
necessary or wise to defer to the lower court's policy judgment. The
usual reasons for deference are absent. Much more will be said
" Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 549 (1948); Osborn
v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 64-66 (1940). In the latter case, in context of the legislative
jurisdiction to regulate, the Court stated:
When these beliefs are emphasized by legislation embodying similar no-
tions of policy in a dozen states, it would savor of intolerance for us to
suggest that a legislature could not constitutionally entertain the views
which the legislature adopts.
rd. at 64-65.
m See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968). The Historical and
Practice Notes following this statute begin: "With the adoption of this section ... ,
Illinois expanded the in personam jurisdiction of its courts to the limits permitted
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." There follows an
extended discussion of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
and it progeny. This indicates to me that the commentators think that the legisla-
ture was deferring to judicial judgment as to the proper limits of judicial jurisdic-
tion. The Illinois statute is the pioneer in state long arm statutes. More recently
legislatures have made no pretense of definition of limits but defer entirely to
judicial limits. See, e.g., CAL. [Civ. Pro.] CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1972): "A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Consti-
tution of this state or of the United States." But see the new West Virginia long
arm statute, supra note 30. Although this new act is prolix and unduly restrictive,
it at least gives some long needed relief to local plaintiffs against foreign defendants.
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with regard to deference in the articles on substantive and proce-
dural due process. In the territorial context, in general, the court
is almost by definition protecting an outsider's interest. Since one
might be naturally suspicious of the product of the political process
as it effects nonparticipants in that process, the usual reason for
lowered deference is present.89
Conclusion
Can this analysis of the territorial problem be somehow put
together into one or two useable standards for judging actual
cases? Hopefully, something more result-predicting than a general
principle (as in International Shoe) will be generated in Part II of
this article. International Shoe and its recent progeny0 have car-
ried us to the right principle. It is the duty of legal scholarship to
attempt to make the principle yield some result-predicting rules.
" United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in part
reads: "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond-
ingly more searching inquiry." Outsiders like certain "insular minorities" get little
protection from "the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
on." Perhaps, in the area of deference to political judgments, the factor of lack of
representation (see text accompanying notes 51-52 supra) can have its strongest
impact.
See Note, Civil Procedure- Concepts of Personal Jurisdiction Before and
After Shaffer v. Heitner, supra note 19, at 297 n.62 and cases cited therein.
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In concurring in a denial of a leave to file a bill of complaint
invoking the Court's original jurisdiction, in California v. Texas,'
the three judges concluded (with Stevens, J. concurring)2 that the
Federal Interpleader Statute3 could be used by estates threatened
with double death taxation.' This implies that double taxation is
perceived by them as at least unfair enough to allow a common
federal forum to adjudicate all the tax claims at once. The lan-
guage also suggests that multiple taxation5 is unfair but not uncon-
stitutionally unfair, except when it is a tax on tangible property.
Curiously, Justice Stewart cites' First National Bank v.
Maine,7 without mentioning that that case was expressly over-
ruled." Speculation that Justice Stewart is covertly resurrecting its
broad holding that double taxation is per se unconstitutional is
belied by the later citation9 of Worcester County Trust Co. v.
Riley. '0 However, the citation to First National Bank v. Maine does
suggest that Justice Stewart feels that the principle that
"intangible personal property may, at least theoretically, be taxed
only at the place of the owner's domicile,"" is a rule of federal law.
Although it was that very holding that was overruled in State Tax
Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich,'2 perhaps Stewart is saying that
Aldrich only overruled the constitutional no-double-taxation pred-
icate of Maine and so the domiciliary-only rule is still viable as a
matter of federal common law. In fact the domiciliary-only rule is
still followed in most states as a matter of state law. But since each
state makes its own determination of domicile by its own defini-
tion, a taxpayer may be subject to conflicting findings of domicile
and be multiply taxed. 3 By allowing statutory interpleader the
1 437 U.S. 601 (1978).
2 Brennan, J. wrote a brief comment, id. at 601, Stewart, J., a longer opinion,
id. at 602, and Powell, J., a brief comment, id. at 615.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
See especially 437 U.S. at 608 & nn.9 & 10.
437 U.S. at 608 n.9, 615-16.
Id. at 602 n.1, 607.
284 U.S. 312 (1931).
See note 55, supra, main text.
437 U.S. at 607, 612.
302 U.S. 292 (1937).
437 U.S. at 602 n.1.
12 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
'1 In re Dorrance's Estate, 116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503 (Perog. Ct. 1934); In
re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (1934); In re Dorrance's Estate,
309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932).
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claims can be resolved in one law suit. But whose law? Since the
basis of the statutory interpleader action is diversity, the Klaxon
doctrine" would dictate use of the forum state's choice of law rule.
The choice of law rule is the domicile of decedent at the time of
death. 5 Thus the choice of the state law as to domicile of decedent
for taxing intangibles turns on the domicile of the decedent of the
estate, probably the same test. In any event, having domicile
found in one federal law suit should avoid double domicile and
thus double taxation. But applying state law in the federal inter-
pleader action may promote, not' avoid, forum shopping because
the stakeholder (estate administrator) may choose for venue,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1397, that state whose definition of domicile
most likely will put domicile in the state with the lowest death
taxes. Even conceding that that judgment would require a level of
sophistication bordering on the mystical, and that fact-inference
rather than law-inference is the more important cause in generat-
ing different results in domicile decisions, nonetheless, the use of
state law in federal interpleader actions of conflicting state death
tax of intangibles would promote some forum shopping, the avoid-
ance of which is one of the twin aims of Erie as pronounced in
Hanna v. Plumer.11 Moreover, sound choice of law doctrine dic-
tates the avoidance of forum shopping, when possible. 7
A special federal common law of domicile for death taxes is
the obvious solution to the forum shopping problem. Two things
are necessary for federal common law to obtain: first, the subject
must be within national legislative power; and second, either Con-
gress intended that the subject b.e governed by federal law fash-
ioned by the federal judiciary, or the basic scheme of the Constitu-
tion demands federal law so fashioned." The idea that the basic
scheme of the Constitution demands federal law is explored in
Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law. 9 Professor
Monaghan criticizes the notion that the "need for national uni-
" Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); recently reaffirmed in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Chal.
loner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
See, e.g., White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
17 Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role
and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 Hxv. L. REv.
347, 350-56 (1974).
" This is a paraphrase of Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 383 (1964).
" 89 H v. L. Rav. 1, 13-17 (1975).
[Vol. 81
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss3/2
TERRITORIAL DUE PROCESS
formity" is a proper rubric for discussing the imperative of the
basic constitutional scheme.2 Such rubric does not suggest the
depth of analysis necessary to the determination. However, such
rubric does, I suggest, intuitively touch the heart of the problems
generated by the "basic scheme" of federalistic interrelationships
established by the Constitution. Whatever the correct formulation
for the analysis of the propriety of federal common law, federal
common law is appropriate in the domicile-for-death-taxes situa-
tion. First, it is clearly within the national legislative power to
make this rule, as it is to make all choice of law rules.2 Second,
Justice Stewart argues effectively in California v. Texas that it is
the federalistic system, which was created by the Constitution,
that causes the dilemma of either unfair double taxation or cutting
off the perhaps legitimate tax claims of the second state.3 Thus
this "basic scheme" dictates a uniform federal rule.
Moreover, the availability of the interpleader action itself
implies an immunity for the estate from more than one death tax
on intangibles on account of domicile. "Under both the statute and
the rule, the purpose [of interpleader] is to protect against double
vexation in respect to a single liability, rather than to double liabil-
ity ... ."21 Justice Stewart adds: "If it is unfair to subject an
estate to two domicile-based taxes when all agree that it is possible
to have only one domicile, that unfairness is just as great, if not
greater, when a decedent's estate is able to pay the taxes to both
States." 24 The source of this immunity must be federal law since
no single state law could create such an immunity. But Justice
Stewart makes clear that the source of this federal immunity is not
a due process right to immunity from double taxation. It must be
a federal common law right to immunity from conflicting domici-
liary findings. It is this latter conceptual leap that is difficult to
digest. The source of the federal right is not statutory or constitu-
tional, but common law, but the mandate to federal common law
is inferred from the Constitution.
If the ultimate source of this right of immunity from double
taxation is the Constitution, why is it not called a constitutional
right? First, because ordinary constitutional rights are inferred
Id. at 12 n.65, 13 n.70.
2 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRs AND THE FEDERAL SysTM
713-18 (2d ed. 1953).
437 U.S. at 608 n.9.
2 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDEAL CouRrs 363 (3d ed. 1976).
21 437 U.S. at 611.
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from discreet language in the Constitution, even though very gen-
eral language-such as the due process clause. The doctrine defin-
ing the rights is said to flow from policy implicit in the discreet
language. Constitutional common law, on the other hand, is in-
ferred from the basic constitutional scheme, not discreet language.
It is more frankly judicially created policy. But such policy is ulti-
mately based on the judicial perception of a just legal order im-
plicit in the constitutionally created federal system. In other
words, unfairness, as perceived by a common law code of optimal
fairness, not a constitutional code of fundamental fairness, and
that is caused by the federal scheme established by the Constitu-
tion, ought to be cured by the imposition of federal law in so far
as practical (here by a federal forum, remedy and right) without
declaring the particular act of unfairness (here an adjudication of
a second domicile and resultant double taxation) unconstitutional.
This also avoids any unfairness to the second state. Moreover,
federal common law can be changed by Congress but constitu-
tional decisions cannot be.
In short, Justice Stewart suggests in California v. Texas that
taxes on the transfer of intangibles on the death of the owner may
be levied only by the state of the owner's domicile, and the deter-
mination of the owner's domicile is a question of federal common
law to be developed in federal interpleader actions but to be ap-
plied also in state adjudications. Only thus can the citation of First
National Bank v. Maine sans the overruling Aldrich case, and the
noting of federal interpleader as an appropriate action for
multiple-tax threatened estates be explained. Moreover, this solu-
tion avoids the dilemma of choosing between a second state's de-
fensible adjudication of domicile and double taxation of the estate.
Problems remain, however, where federal interpleader is not in-
voked by the estate. If the first state's adjudication of domicile
becomes res judicata before the second state makes known its in-
tent to tax on a domiciliary basis, the first judgment is not res
judicata to the second state (a non-party) but is res judicata to the
estate, and full faith and credit does not bar the inconsistent sec-
ond state court adjudication.2 A possible solution is to allow the
threatened estate to bring its interpleader action at this point and
let the rival state claimants fight it out in a neutral federal forum
using federal law. If the first judgment has been paid then the
estate can claim that the first state holds such payment as the
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
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stake (as an equitable constructive trust if a traditional concep-
tional fiction is necessary), with the estate proferring the balance
of the stake if the second state's tax is greater.
What is left of Aldrich? At least the proposition that double
taxation is not per se unconstitutional. Perhaps double taxation of
intangibles is still permissible if one tax is a domiciliary tax and
the other is based on nondomiciliary contacts, as in Aldrich. That
is consistent with the interpleader action but not with the citation
of Maine. The test will come when someone tries federal inter-
pleader in the Maine-Aldrich tax situations. My guess is that the
obvious difficulty of determining the fact of double taxation when
two different kinds of tax or two different theoretical subjects of
taxation are used will give the courts pause, and the absolute mini-
mum reading of California v. Texas (if any credence is given it at
all) will be adopted: one has a right to a federal forum and remedy,
and a right to a single domiciliary-based tax on intangibles at
death, but no right to a single tax.
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